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NAVAL LEADERSHIP AND SOCIETY

by

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March 1997

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NAVAL LEADERSHIP AND SOCIETY

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Tensions between society and the uniformed leaders of the military have produced disastrous results for some democracies. If the peaceful nature of American civil-military relations is to continue through the twenty-first century, a certain level of understanding and shared views need to exist between the military's senior leaders and society.

This thesis explores whether senior leaders of the naval service are becoming isolated from society; and, if so, the implications this divide may have on civil-military relations. Three measures of civil-military interaction--racial/ethnic representation, military experience, and shared values--are used to assess the extent of isolation between the nation's naval leaders and society. These measures of interaction are examined with historical and projected statistics on racial/ethnic representation among naval officers, Congressional voting records on defense-related legislation, and interviews with a sample of retired flag and general officers. The results suggest growing isolation and tension between naval leaders and society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	BACKGROUND	1
B.	ANALYSIS	6
C.	METHODOLOGY	13
II.	RACIAL AND ETHNIC REPRESENTATION	15
A.	COMPOSITION OF SENIOR LEADERS IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS	17
B.	U.S. POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS	23
C.	JUNIOR OFFICER DEMOGRAPHICS	26
III.	MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN SOCIETY	33
A.	LEGISLATIVE BRANCH	34
B.	EXECUTIVE BRANCH	42
C.	READINESS VERSUS MODERNIZATION	47
IV.	VALUES	51
A.	VALUES IN SOCIETY	51
B.	SOCIALIZATION	54
C.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS	60
V.	CONCLUSIONS	63
	APPENDIX	69
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	71
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	73

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1.	Alternative Population Projections Using Different Component Levels: 1990 to 2050	24
Figure 3.1.	<i>Los Angeles Times</i> Poll: A Closer Look at Who Opposes Lifting Ban	45
Figure 4.1.	U.S. Marine Corps, Character Development	56

x

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1.	Naval Flag and General Officer Rank Structure	2
Table 2.1.	Average Years of Education for USMC General Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995	18
Table 2.2.	Average Years of Education for USN Flag Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995	18
Table 2.3.	Average Years of Service for USMC General Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995	19
Table 2.4.	Average Years of Service for USN Flag Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995	19
Table 2.5.	Number of USMC General Officers by Race/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995	21
Table 2.6.	Number of USN Flag Officers by Race/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995	22
Table 2.7.	Percent Distribution of the U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, 1995-2050	25
Table 2.8.	Percent Distribution of USMC and USN Officers (Pay Grades, 0-1 through 0-6) by Race/Ethnic Group, Selected Years, 1971-1990	27
Table 2.9.	Percent Distribution of USMC Officers by Race/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade (0-1 through 0-6), September 1995	28
Table 2.10.	Percent Distribution of USN Officers by Race/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade (0-1 through 0-6), September 1995	29
Table 3.1.	Percentage of Members of Congress with Military Experience, by Session, Legislative Body, and Type of Service	35
Table 3.2.	U.S. Senate Voting Behavior on Pro-Defense Legislation, by Session, Birth Cohort, and Veteran Status	37
Table 3.3.	House of Representatives Voting Behavior on Pro-Defense Legislation, by Session, Birth Cohort, and Veteran Status	38

Table 4.1.	Naval Flag and General Officers Opinions Concerning the Importance of the Military in Shaping their Values	58
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

In the realm of civil-military relations, much has been written on the nature of senior leaders of the armed forces--from a 1956 discussion of The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills to more recent works by Jacques Van Doorn, Morris Janowitz, Eliot Cohen, and Samuel Huntington. A large body of literature also exists on the relationship between the armed forces and society. This field includes The Soldier and the State, The Professional Soldier, and Armed Forces and Society, along with many other works. Missing, however, is a current view of the nation's highest-ranking military leaders and their association with American society.

Is the association of military leaders and American society important? If the peaceful nature of American civil-military relations is to continue through the twenty-first century, a certain level of understanding and shared views need to exist between senior leaders of the military and society. This thesis explores whether the flag and general officer corps of the naval service is becoming isolated from society; and, if so, the implications this divide may have on civil-military relations. Research focuses specifically on senior leaders of the United States Navy (USN) and the United States Marine Corps (USMC), and their association with society, to gauge the current state of civil-military relations. Three commonly-cited measures of civil-military interaction or association--racial/ethnic representation, military experience, and shared values--are used to assess the extent of isolation between the nation's naval leaders and society.

Correcting a rupture in relations between society and naval leaders would require a concerted effort on the part of both entities. Correcting these elements of measurement alone, however, will not guarantee harmonious civil-military relations. A more comprehensive examination of civil-military relations might encompass many more variables, such as a wide assortment of background demographics, issues of gender--including the 1991 "Tailhook" scandal--and political party affiliations, to name a few. Instead, measures of association in this study more narrowly address how these two groups may be brought closer together to better represent the interests of both society and the military.

Senior military leaders are defined here as generals and admirals in the active service of the four branches of the United States Armed Forces. The study looks exclusively at senior leaders in the Navy and Marine Corps, otherwise referred to as general and flag officers. These senior leaders include officers in pay grades 0-7 through 0-10, wearing one through four stars, respectively. The pay grades and ranks of senior officers in the Navy and Marine Corps are reflected in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. Naval Flag and General Officer Rank Structure

Pay Grade	Navy	Marine Corps
0-7	Rear Admiral (Lower Half)	Brigadier General
0-8	Rear Admiral (Upper Half)	Major General
0-9	Vice Admiral	Lieutenant General
0-10	Admiral	General

Why is it important to look at the senior leaders of the armed forces, particularly those in the Navy and Marine Corps? There are two main reasons why the military's generals and admirals should be studied. First, these leaders are supposed to represent the very highest values and character of all military professionals. In many ways, military service, military policy decisions, and service culture, are molded, directed, and formed by the military's generals and admirals. A great deal of responsibility is held at the lower levels of the services, but the ultimate decisions and authority below the civilian chain of command lie with the general and flag officers. Therefore, these military leaders are a key element in the interaction of a military and society. Second, the policy decisions of these senior-most leaders have a distinct impact on both international and domestic events (i.e., civil-military relations). Samuel Huntington explains the unique nature of the military on the international and domestic scene:

The most distinctive, the most fascinating, and the most troublesome aspect of military policy is its Janus-like quality. Indeed, military policy not only faces in two directions, it exists in two worlds. One is international politics, the world of the balance of power, wars and alliances, the subtle and the brutal uses of force and diplomacy to influence the behavior of other states. The principal currency of this world is actual or potential military strength: battalions, weapons, and warships. The other world is domestic politics, the world of interest groups, political parties, social classes, with their conflicting interests and goals. The currency here is the resources of society: men, money, material. Any major decision in military policy influences and is influenced by both worlds.¹

¹Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense. Strategic Programs In National Politics, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1961, p. 1.

A connection can then be made in civil-military relations between society and its military leaders. The Navy and Marine Corps, in particular, represent the cutting edge of readiness, deployed forces, and influence around the world. This is evident over the past several years with their documented influence on international events.² Given the extensive use of the naval service to enforce U.S. foreign policy, and as an instrument of American societal views, it seems appropriate to explore the relationship of its top-most leaders with society.

“Society” is generally defined as “...a highly structured system of human organization for large-scale community living that normally furnishes protection, continuity, security, and a national identity for its members.”³ C. Wright Mills draws a distinction between the “public” and “mass society” when it comes to the “power elite” and how America’s democratic society works. As Mills writes:

In a public, as we may understand the term, (1) virtually as many people express opinions as receive them. (2) Public communications are so organized that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3) readily finds an outlet in effective action, even against--if necessary--the prevailing system of authority.

At the opposite extreme, in a mass, (1) far fewer people express opinions than receive them; for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The

²During the last several years the naval service has deployed forces in the form of Marine Amphibious Units (MEU), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), and Carrier Task Forces (CTF), to meet national foreign policy goals. These forces have most noticeably been seen in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and the North China Sea.

³Random House Webster's College Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1990, p. 1270.

communications that prevail to answer back immediately or with any effect.
(3) The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels of such action.⁴

Although American society can hardly be described as a public democracy, based on this definition, we have not fully gone down the road of a mass society either. As such, the American people still retain the ability to voice their concerns and opinions formally through federal, state, and local representation. Informally, representation occurs through the influence of interest groups, public opinion, and corporate organizations, just to name a few.

Since democracies first began to flourish around the world, there has been concern over the power of the military and the character of civil-military relations. As Eliot Cohen points out in Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, the Founding Fathers were quite concerned about the dangers of creating a standing army.⁵ In recent times, democracies around the world have seen the crumbling of civil-military relations, resulting in revolutions, open warfare, and military coups d'etat.⁶ While these are distant cases from the United States, they still provide concern for the future of American civil-military relations. The

⁴C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959, pp. 303-304.

⁵Eliot Cohen, Commandos And Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978, p. 1 and 105 , makes reference to and cites the *Federalist Papers* (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), p. 179. “In the *Federalist Papers*, Alexander Hamilton, advocate of a standing army, tried to reassure those who mistrusted the concept of a ‘select corps.’ He argued against their apprehensions that a professional soldiery would endanger the liberties of a free people. He addressed thereby the fundamental anxiety of civil-military relations--the fear that the guardians of the polity might turn against it. ...*Federalist* Number 29 proposes the creation of a ‘select corps’ much smaller than the state militias, Hamilton was careful not to call such a force a standing army, although that was clearly what he meant. He said that the corps would: ‘...never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow citizens.’”

⁶Conflict in civil-military relations has been most evident in past hostilities within countries such as Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Afghanistan, Iran, and others.

enduring challenge is to ensure that the relationship between society and senior leaders of the military remains consistent with our rich democratic heritage. By retaining society's stake in the military, we prevent possible alienation and isolation of the two entities from each other. This thesis uses three common yard sticks in society and politics to measure isolation between our naval leaders and society. These are racial/ethnic representation, military experience, and values.

B. ANALYSIS

Race, race relations, and racial representation continue to be central themes in American politics, well after Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson began writing on the subjects in the 1860s.⁷ Today, race-related issues are typically framed in terms of "Black vs. White," but they obviously encompass a much larger blend of society.⁸ Ethnicity is another component of American society that is commonly overlooked and assumed to be somehow blended away in the nation's great "melting pot."⁹

⁷Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, and Slavery In Massachusetts, and Ralph Waldo Emerson's, Essay on Nature, Electronically Enhanced Text, 1991, World Library, Inc., Essays published in 1849, 1854, and 1848, respectively.

⁸The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census categorizes the population into four racial and two ethnic groups: White, Black, American Indian, and Asian/Pacific Islander are the racial groups; and Hispanic and Non-Hispanic are the two ethnic groups. While this method does provide a convenient and simple way of dividing the population, it does not accurately account for groups that cross several cultural boundaries or the many different subcultures of any one group.

⁹The term, "melting pot" actually originated in a popular 19th Century play of the same name. Most people reject the notion that Americans have been so "blended" to lose their religious, racial, or original ethnic identities. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover and London, 1990, pp. 275-276, 288.

In urban America, Dallas, Texas, symbolizes the ongoing racial tensions public schools are experiencing today. School tensions in Dallas are partly due to the city's changing racial makeup. Whites are a small minority of public school students, while still comprising nearly half of the city's population.¹⁰ At the same time, in March 1991, several white police officers in the city of Los Angeles brutally beat Rodney G. King, a black man, with night sticks. The officers were later charged with civil rights violations, and the outcome of their trial sparked the "Los Angeles Riots," in which active duty marines participated as "peacemakers." The examples of Dallas and Los Angeles raise some disturbing questions about the state of race relations in America. The fact remains that racial and ethnic issues continue to be unsettled and often divisive.

The U.S. population has been in racial and ethnic transition, from the time when the first European settlers arrived in a land occupied by indigenous Indian tribes, to the arrival of boat loads of slaves from Africa, through waves of both legal and illegal immigration, to today's diverse composition. The nation was founded by white men, principally of English and German descent, who were firmly dedicated to a Protestant work ethic. Over the years, legal, illegal, and forced immigration has expanded the national population to include people of European, African, Asian, Mexican, Latin American, and Middle Eastern descent, to name

¹⁰Public schools in Dallas, Texas, were 41 percent White, 45 percent Black, and 13 percent Hispanic in 1975-1976. In 1995-1996, public schools were 12 percent White, 42 percent Black, and 44 percent Hispanic. The 1990 Census reflects the racial and ethnic composition of Dallas, Texas to be, 48 percent White, 28 percent Black, 21 percent Hispanic, and 3 percent Other. This might indicate that White children are being sent to public schools outside Dallas's school district, or that White children are attending private schools in growing numbers. See Sue Anne Pressley, "In diverse Dallas, a Power Struggle Over Schools: The nation's eighth-largest city is still one of the most stubbornly segregated," *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, October 7-13, 1996, p. 29.

a few. This ever-changing social fabric of the United States has been described in many ways, based largely on the politics of the times. “In the course of American history,” according to Milton M. Gordon’s classic study of Assimilation in American Life, “there have been three theories of the assimilation process.”

...Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and, more recently, cultural pluralism. On the whole, the theory of Anglo-conformity postulates the complete renunciation of the immigrant’s ancestral culture in favor of the behavior and cultural values of the Anglo-Saxon majority.¹¹

The “melting pot” is where all immigrant races are supposedly blended together in the great crucible, losing their ancestral heritage and hatreds as they become an “American.” “Cultural pluralism” is where each immigrant’s cultural heritage is interwoven to form an “American Quilt” or mosaic of different cultures. By any description one may choose to describe the nation, it is clear that the diversity of the population cannot be denied. This is perhaps best captured in the motto of the “Great Seal of United States,” which states *E Pluribus Unum*--from many, one.

While Americans of almost all racial and ethnic backgrounds served in the nation’s military since its inception, a policy of racial/ethnic representation is only a recent undertaking. On October 9, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt abolished all-volunteer enlistments in favor of a black quota for the Army. This policy decision has been seen as a combination of the War Department’s routine prewar mobilization plan, and a move by the

¹¹Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, Quoted in E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment Revisited, edited by Howard G. Schneiderman, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1991, p. 217.

president to accommodate civil rights activists concerning jobs in the military. The naval service adopted a similar policy in 1942, attempting to maintain a racial or ethnic structure that was roughly consistent with that of society.¹² The quota system has changed in name and theory to racial and ethnic “recruiting goals,” but the basic underlying premise is that the composition of the military should somehow “reflect” society. Interestingly, over the years since blacks were first recruited in proportion to their numbers in the national population, they have become overrepresented in the military.¹³ This is certainly true among the enlisted ranks of the Navy and Marine Corps, where blacks, for example, accounted for approximately 18 percent of the force in 1996--but not true among officers in these services, where all minority racial or ethnic groups have been underrepresented (or unrepresented) throughout American history.

Representation of minorities in the military, as well as in other institutions, continues to be a controversial issue. Civil rights legislation on voting was passed by Congress in 1965 and then amended in 1975 and 1982. This legislation helped restructure voting districts to better support minority groups in the election of fellow minorities. Although this legislation was later ruled unconstitutional, a continued emphasis on such legislation displays the concern given to minority groups in America.

¹²Morris J. MacGregor, Jr, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1981, pp. 18-19.

¹³Ibid., p. vii. “In contrast to the racial proportionality that characterized U.S. armed forces throughout most of the nation’s history, the 410,000 blacks under arms in 1981 represent about 20 percent of all military personnel, a proportion far greater than the 11 or 12 percent of the total population that is black. Moreover, blacks make up a still larger share of the ground combat forces: one of every three Army GIs is black, as is one of every five enlisted marines.”

Census Bureau projections show that racial and ethnic groups will increase by the following amounts by the year 2050: 7.4 percent for whites, 69.5 percent for blacks, 258.3 percent for Hispanics, 83.0 percent for American Indians, and 269.1 percent for Asians. As minority groups become a relatively larger part of the general population, it can only be assumed that their political power will increase as well. While the military and society seem able to accept an overrepresentation of minorities within the enlisted ranks, how will this play out over time? If minority groups gain majority status as a percentage of the population, should they “rightfully” have proportional representation within the most senior ranks of America’s institutions, including its military?

How important is it that our elected and appointed officials understand the military through personal experience? The President, the President’s cabinet, and both houses of Congress are considered representatives of the American people and society. This level of government has regular interaction with the flag and general officers of the naval service. According to the Constitution, and the War Powers Act of 1973, there is a clear delineation of power and responsibility among the President, Congress, and the armed forces. In planning and executing domestic and foreign policy, there is a vital interaction of the nation’s top military officers, the President, and Congress. First-hand knowledge of military matters by civilian leaders in apportioning money and planning foreign policy is critical for a harmonious relationship to continue. If, however, elected officials and society begin to lose touch with the intricacies of military service, the nation may find itself becoming isolated from the military and its senior-most leaders.

A similar relationship might exist between a professional football coach and his team. Would the players trust the judgment and opinions of a professional football coach who never played the game before? As James Fallows writes:

A Washington writer named Don Winter pointed out in 1980 that of the 103 members of Congress who were officially part of the "Vietnam generation" (men born between June 30, 1939, and June 30, 1954), only 14 (or about 14 percent) served on active duty anywhere in the military at any time during the Vietnam war. By comparison, about 28 percent of the generation as a whole served on active duty during Vietnam. While more than two thirds of all senators born before 1939 had served on active duty, mainly in World War II, only one third of senators and representatives born after 1939 had served in any military capacity, including the reserves and the National guard. After the elections of 1980, the number of congressmen with military experience declined further still.¹⁴

How can society expect its elected representatives to understand the intricacies of defense planning, budgeting, and carrying out the military end of foreign policy when so few of them have any practical military experience? In the military and government, as in football or any field, if you want to "lead the team," then you had better "know the game." What better way to understand how things operate than from first-hand experience? What impact will there be on the senior leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps as they deal with the White House and Congress in the future? Is society or the government becoming less interested or less knowledgeable in military matters, creating a degree of isolation?

More fundamental than differing military experience in civil-military relations would be a contrast in values held by military leaders compared with those held by society and their

¹⁴James Fallows, National Defense, Random House, New York, 1981, pp. 136-137.

elected and appointed officials. Values are "...an individual's or group's ideas about the worth or importance of people, things, and concepts."¹⁵ Is there a difference between the values held by the senior military officers and those of society and our elected officials? If there is a difference, why is it so, and what impact may it have on civil-military relations?

Individual and group values are generally not formed in isolation, but are a process of socialization throughout life's experience. Much research has documented differing views of value development. Some researchers place the greatest emphasis on early childhood development, while others put greater weight on life's maturing process. Despite this specific disagreement, a commonly held position is that the process of socialization by institutions has a tremendous effect on value development.¹⁶ The importance of this is that military leaders are socialized in a very different organization than, say, elected officials. The result of this difference has the potential to isolate society from its senior military leaders, as Janowitz observes:

Ultimately, political control of the military profession hinges on the answer to the question: Why do officers fight?

Political democracies assume that officers can be effectively motivated by professional ethnics alone. The officer fights because of his career commitment.... He is amenable to civilian political control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the

¹⁵"Values and the Leader," *Leadership*, Publication B0609, The Basic School, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, 1989.

¹⁶Morris Janowitz in collaboration with Roger W. Little, Sociology And The Military Establishment, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, 1974.

constabulary force. He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its common values.¹⁷

Value conflicts among military leaders and elected officials can potentially affect civil-military relations. These conflicts also constitute the greatest challenge to military leaders because of the difficulty in dealing with someone who genuinely dislikes what advice or guidance is given on military matters or whose deeply held beliefs may differ from those of the senior leader. If military leaders develop a genuinely different set of values than those held by society and its elected officials, tension and isolation may occur. If a conflict of values occurs in our democracy's civil-military relations, will it cause tension between the military's senior leaders and society or their elected officials? If tension is a result, are there certain aspects of socialization that bring it to bear?

C. METHODOLOGY

The three measures of interaction or association--racial/ethnic representation, military experience, and values--are developed to further understand military leaders and society. The research provides a critical analysis of senior leaders in the officer corps of the Navy and Marine Corps, and their association with society.

The first measure of association between senior officers and society is examined using U.S. Bureau of Census population projections, with particular emphasis on the growing racial and ethnic diversity in the population. In addition, past and present U.S. military racial

¹⁷Morris Janowitz, The Future of the Military Profession, pp. 77-78., In War, Morality, and the Military Profession, edited by Malham M. Wakin, Westview Press, Boulder, 1986, pp. 57-79.

diversity figures are examined in relation to their corresponding U.S. population figures. The second measure of association evaluates indications and the possible implications of the President and Congress not having some military experience. Has this difference in experience influenced policy decisions of judgment, warfighting needs, and individual service qualification; and, if so, in what way and at what possible cost? This evaluation is done through the careful review of Congressional records and published literature in determining the military background of those who serve in Congress and the White House, and recent policy decisions by the President and Congress pertaining to the senior leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps. The third measure of association, values, is addressed by comparing the ethos fostered by the military elite with that of the public. The study draws heavily upon information gained from interviews or correspondence with seventeen retired flag and general officers in the Navy and Marine Corps. (See Appendix.)

The next three chapters examine themes introduced above in greater detail. These chapters assess whether racial/ethnic representation, military experience, and values can be used to gauge the state of civil-military relations between naval leaders and society.

II. RACIAL AND ETHNIC REPRESENTATION

A complex relationship exists in national security between many factors found in the domestic, international, and political arenas. With the end of the Cold War, domestic concerns have become relatively more important in determining how the U.S. organizes, trains, equips, and staffs its armed forces. One particular area, population representation in the military, has been a focus of interest since the end of the draft in 1973, and it has received renewed attention and emphasis during the post-Cold War, “downsizing” era. Eitelberg wrote about representation in the military in 1986:

‘Representation,’ ...can provide a definitive answer to the longstanding question: “Who shall serve when not all serve?” Fairness can be assured to the extent that the few who do serve in the military compose a cross section of all who are equally obligated to defend the nation; and one can assume all sectors of society are represented when identified groups are present in proportion to their presence in the total population—that is, when membership of the military is mathematically similar in some way to the nation’s citizenry.¹⁸

The Secretary of the Navy published a letter of instruction in 1995 that directs the Navy and Marine Corps to achieve a composition of 12 percent black, 12 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent Asian/Pacific Islander/Native American (and other minorities) among newly-commissioned officers by the year 2000. This goal was also established for the composition of the officer corps as a whole over the long-term. The Secretary’s initiative has been called the “12-12-5 Plan,” and it virtually doubles the previous goals for representation of

¹⁸Mark J. Eitelberg, Representation and Race in America’s Volunteer Military, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 1986, p. 10.

minorities in the officer corps. Operation Order 1-95, dated 17 March 1995, entitled "Campaign Plan to Increase Diversity Within the Officer Corps of the Marine Corps," details the reasons for diversity as stated by General Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Krulak's principal reason for this campaign plan is "...to achieve an officer corps reflective of the racial composition of America."¹⁹

In 1975, Morris Janowitz wrote about the racial composition of the All-Volunteer Force and made some relevant comments. "In the ethnically pluralist society of the Untied States," Janowitz observed:

...[R]ace constitutes our country's most fundamental cleavage. If our American society is ever to realize its democratic goals, the direction its race relations take in the armed forces will be a prime factor.

In a broader sense, Janowitz asked: "Can a political democracy expect to have a legitimate form of government if its military is not broadly representative of the larger society?"²⁰ This chapter explores the racial and ethnic composition of flag and general officers and society. Several questions are addressed. First, what is the current, and historic, racial and ethnic composition of the flag and general officer corps, and can it be said to "reflect" society? Second, will the changing distributions of racial/ethnic groups in the national population somehow affect senior leaders of the naval service? Last, what do indicators of racial and

¹⁹Operation Order 1-95, Campaign Plan to Increase Diversity Within the Officer Corps of the Marine Corps, 17 March 1995.

²⁰Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, Inc., 1975, p. 284.

ethnic representation say about senior leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps and their relationship with civilian society?

A. COMPOSITION OF SENIOR LEADERS IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The composition of the flag and general officer corps is influenced by many factors related to the accession, training, education, assignment, augmentation, promotion, and development of naval officers. Before looking at the racial and ethnic composition of this group, some common measurable factors are examined that characterize flag and general officers, regardless of race or ethnicity. Given the difficult nature of examining each of the important aspects of advancement in the naval service over several decades, the study focuses initially on two measures commonly used in studies of flag and general officers. These are average years in service and average years of education.

A large proportion of generals and admirals hold graduate degrees in a wide variety of disciplines, although there is no stated requirement regarding educational level as an officer rises through the ranks. Virtually all newly-commissioned officers today have at least a bachelor's degree; and evidence shows that educational advancement beyond the bachelor's level tends to enhance an officer's likelihood for promotion.

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 depict the average years of education of USMC and USN flag and general officers, in roughly five-year increments from 1971 to 1995. The mean average years of education for officers in the combined pay grades 07 through 10, over the period shown, are 17.5 years for USMC and 18 years for USN. Often, education beyond 16 years

Table 2.1. Average Years of Education for USMC General Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995

Pay Grade	1971*	1975*	1980*	1985	1990	1995
0-10	16.0	16.0	18.0	16.5	16.0	17.0
0-9	17.3	18.5	18.3	16.3	16.8	16.8
0-8	18.5	17.6	18.8	16.7	16.7	16.7
0-7	18.5	18.1	18.7	16.7	16.7	16.6

* 1971, 1975, 1980 data were converted from degrees obtained to years of education.

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 199

Table 2.2. Average Years of Education for USN Flag Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995

Pay Grade	1971	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
0-10	16.9	17.2	18.3	16.8	17.2	17.5
0-9	17.5	18.3	18.1	16.7	17.3	18.0
0-8	17.8	19.0	18.7	16.6	17.6	17.8
0-7	18.3	18.8	19.0	16.7	17.9	17.8

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

is the result of academically accredited military courses taken in a residence or non-residence status or through one of numerous graduate degree programs.²¹

Average years of service for flag and general officers further paints a picture of the requirements involved in obtaining elite status in the naval service. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 depict

²¹These may include courses at institutions such as Command and Staff College, Amphibious Warfare School, Naval War College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces as well as the Naval Postgraduate School and graduate studies at civilian universities.

Table 2.3. Average Years of Service for USMC General Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995

Pay Grade	1971	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
0-10	35.0	35.0	34.5	36.0	35.5	33.3
0-9	34.1	34.8	34.4	33.8	33.1	32.9
0-8	31.9	33.1	31.4	32.0	32.9	31.0
0-7	29.7	29.2	28.8	30.0	28.3	29.1

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

Table 2.4. Average Years of Service for USN Flag Officers by Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995

Pay Grade	1971	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
10	35.1	27.2	30.1	35.6	34.6	34.1
0-9	33.1	30.8	32.5	31.1	33.4	32.8
0-8	33.0	30.4	31.6	29.1	31.9	32.2
0-7	29.8	28.7	28.7	29.5	29.4	29.4

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

the average years in service for flag and general officers by pay grade. The mean average years of service for all flag and general pay grades combined is 30.9 years and 30.5 years, USMC and USN, respectively. Although thirty years of service and 18 years of education alone do not guarantee flag or general officer status, they are good descriptive tools for viewing the composition of this elite group.

The point of reviewing some common characteristics of flag and general officers is to gain an appreciation for the rigid structure of the naval service. Advancement through the

ranks is not guaranteed, and obtainment of elite status is a result of many factors. Two of these factors characterize a well-educated individual who is dedicated to spend over thirty years in the service of his or her country. Corporate America offers many means for advancement, but more often than not, promotions are based primarily on performance. Typically, senior leaders in the corporate world have spent far fewer years in one organization than have their military counterparts. If one is a proven performer, that person can advance with little or no education after only a few years, given the right company. The racial and ethnic composition of the flag and general officer corps in 1996 is the product of commissions that occurred initially sometime before 1966. In many ways, then, the current flag and general officer corps can be considered racially and ethnically reflective of America in the mid-1960s.

Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the number of general and flag officers by racial/ethnic group during selected years between 1971 and 1995. These tables depict just a small slice of the last twenty-five years of racial and ethnic composition, but they do show a white-dominated force at the senior-most levels. In 1995, the Marine Corps had only two black general officers, both brigadier generals, representing 2.9 percent of all marines at this level. The same year, whites accounted for 96.3 percent of all flag officers in the Navy. At the same time, about 0.5 percent of these officers were American Indian, 0.5 percent were Asian, 0.9 percent were Hispanic, and 1.9 percent were black. With only a smattering of minority general and flag officers in the years depicted, there is little question that these numbers were not representative of society.

Table 2.5. Number of USMC General Officers by Racial/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995

Year	Pay Grade	White	Black	Hispanic	American-Indian	Asian
1971	10	2	0	0	0	0
	0-9	9	0	0	0	0
	0-8	25	0	0	0	0
	0-7	38	0	0	0	0
1975	10	1	0	0	0	0
	0-9	8	0	0	0	0
	0-8	22	0	0	0	0
	0-7	37	0	0	0	0
1980	10	2	0	0	0	0
	0-9	7	0	0	0	0
	0-8	24	0	0	0	0
	0-7	1	0	0	0	0
1985	10	2	0	0	0	0
	0-9	8	0	0	0	0
	0-8	21	1	0	0	0
	0-7	34	0	0	0	0
1990	10	2	0	0	0	0
	0-9	8	0	0	0	0
	0-8	25	0	0	0	0
	0-7	34	0	0	0	0
1995	10	3	0	0	0	0
	0-9	9	0	0	0	0
	0-8	22	0	0	0	0
	0-7	32	2	0	0	0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

Table 2.6. Number of USN Flag Officers by Racial/ethnic Group and Pay Grade, Selected Years, 1971-1995


Year	Pay Grade	White	Black	Hispanic	American-Indian	Asian
1971	10	8	1	0	0	0
	0-9	48	0	0	0	0
	0-8	89	2	0	0	0
	0-7	166	0	0	0	0
1975	10	10	0	0	0	0
	0-9	36	0	0	0	0
	0-8	97	1	1	0	0
	0-7	130	1	0	0	0
1980	10	8	0	0	0	0
	0-9	26	0	0	0	0
	0-8	84	1	0	0	0
	0-7	121	2	0	0	0
1985	10	8	0	0	0	0
	0-9	33	0	0	0	0
	0-8	94	1	0	0	0
	0-7	109	1	2	0	2
1990	10	10	0	0	0	0
	0-9	27	0	1	0	1
	0-8	86	1	1	0	0
	0-7	126	2	1	1	1
1995	10	11	0	0	0	0
	0-9	19	2	0	0	0
	0-8	73	0	0	0	1
	0-7	101	2	2	1	0

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

B. U.S. POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

Population demographics are an ever-changing dynamic in any nation, but in the U.S. they inevitably have profound effects in the political realm. As ethnic and racial minority groups in this country begin to organize and grow demographically, so does their political power. The current U.S. population and future projections of the low, middle, and high series are presented in Figure 2.1, covering the years 1990 to 2050. Fueling this large population increase over the next two generations, from 1995 to 2050, are minority groups, as seen in Table 2.7. This increase in minorities will have a great impact, not only on the U.S. population, but also on the composition of the armed forces, assuming a continued emphasis on racial/ethnic representation in the military.

The Bureau of Census divides the U.S. population into four different racial categories and two ethnic groups. The four racial categories are: 1) American Indian, Eskimo and Aleut ("a person having origins in any of the original peoples of North America, who maintains cultural identification through tribal affiliation or community recognition"); 2) Asian and Pacific Islander ("a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands--including, for example China, India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines Islands, and Samoa"); 3) Black ("a person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa"); and 4) White ("a person having



Source: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, p. 25-1130, February 1996, Figure 17, p. 25.

Figure 2.1. Alternative Population Projections Using Different Component Levels: 1990 to 2050

Table 2.7. Percent Distribution of the U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, 1995 to 2050

Year	White	Black	Hispanic	American Indian	Asian	Total
Projections						
Middle Series						
1995	73.6	12.0	10.2	.7	3.3	100.0
2000	71.8	12.2	11.4	.7	3.9	100.0
2005	69.9	12.4	12.6	.8	4.4	100.0
2010	68.0	12.6	13.8	.8	4.8	100.0
2020	64.3	12.9	16.3	.8	5.7	100.0
2030	60.5	13.1	18.9	.8	6.6	100.0
2040	56.7	13.3	21.7	.9	7.5	100.0
2050	52.8	13.6	24.5	.9	8.2	100.0
Lowest Series						
2050	55.8	14.2	22.0	1.0	7.0	100.0
Highest Series						
2050	50.5	13.8	25.7	.8	9.2	100.0

Source: Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P25-1130, Text Table J., p. 13.

origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East").²²

Although these racial categories do encompass a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds and cultures, the Census Bureau has only kept records to distinguish between people of either Hispanic origin or not of Hispanic origin, regardless of race. Therefore, the ethnic categories documented and the choices given citizens are either "Hispanic" or not. Hispanic origin is

²²Current Population Reports: Population Projections of The United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, p. 25-1130, February 1996.

defined as "a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race."²³

As seen in Table 2.7, the racial composition of the United States in 1995 was as follows: 73.6 percent white, 12 percent black, 0.7 percent American Indian, 3.3 percent Asian, and 9 percent of Hispanic origin from all races. By the year 2050, racial and ethnic groups will increase by the following amounts: 7.4 percent white, 69.5 percent black, 258.3 percent Hispanic, 83.0 percent American Indian, and 269.1 percent Asian.²⁴ Given the lengthy service requirement of almost 30 years to reach flag or general officer, is the Navy or Marine Corps prepared to match these racial and ethnic increases that would ensure population representation among its senior leaders in the year 2025?

C. JUNIOR OFFICER DEMOGRAPHICS

Historically, as Table 2.8 shows, the officer corps of the Navy and Marine Corps has not come close to being a reflection of society. As of 1995 (see Tables 2.9 and 2.10), the officer corps is little better in reflecting the racial/ethnic diversity of society. Since the junior officers of today will more or less reflect the flag and general officers of the future, some concern should be given the feasibility of racial and ethnic reflectiveness. Even if the Navy and Marine Corps successfully implement their "12-12-5" officer accession plan by the year 2000, the flag and general officer corps will continue to be out-paced by minority growth in society. This disproportionate relationship can be seen when comparing Tables 2.7, 2.9, and 2.10.

²³Ibid., pp. 29-31.

²⁴Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, p. 25-1130, Table K.

Table 2.8. Percent Distribution of USMC and USN Officers (Pay Grades 0-1 Through 0-6) by Racial/Ethnic Group, Selected Years, 1971-1990

Year	Serv- ice	White	Black	His- panic	Amer- ican Indian	Asian- Pacific Islander	Other	Total
		%	%	%	%	%	%	#
1971	USMC	97.4	1.2	1.2	0	0	0.2	19,841
	USN	98.3	0.6	0.7	0	0.1	0.2	70,248
1975	USMC	95.0	3.1	1.5	0	0	0.5	17,012
	USN	97.2	1.4	0.9	0	0	0.5	60,146
1980	USMC	94.5	3.7	1.0	0.2	0.5	0.1	16,908
	USN	95.4	2.4	0.7	0.2	0.8	0.5	59,995
1985	USMC	92.9	4.4	1.5	0.3	0.8	0.2	18,631
	USN	93.4	3.2	1.4	0.2	1.4	0.4	67,271
1990	USMC	90.9	4.6	2.4	0.7	1.2	0.3	18,035
	USN	91.0	3.9	2.4	0.3	2.0	0.4	69,168

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

Table 2.9. Percent Distribution of USMC Officers by Racial/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade (0-1 through 0-6), September 1995

Pay Grade	White	Black	Hispanic	American Indian	Asian-Pacific Islander	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	#
0-1	82.3	8.1	6.4	0.3	2.3	0.6	2044
0-2	85.6	6.4	4.1	0.2	2.3	0.2	2859
0-3	89.4	4.6	3.3	0.4	1.4	0.4	5457
0-4	92.5	3.5	2.3	0.4	1.1	0.2	3161
0-5	93.1	4.5	1.5	0.3	0.6	0.1	1637
0-6	95.1	2.9	1.4	0.2	0.5	0	626
ALL							
%	89.0	5.1	3.4	1.0	1.5	0.4	100.0
#	14,050	799	534	102	235	64	15,784

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

Table 2.10. Percent Distribution of USN Officers by Racial/Ethnic Group and Pay Grade (0-1 through 0-6), September 1995

Pay Grade	White	Black	Hispanic	American Indian	Asian-Pacific Islander	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	#
0-1	80.6	8.5	5.5	0.6	4.2	0.6	6,391
0-2	84.4	6.7	4.3	0.5	3.8	0.4	7,162
0-3	86.9	5.6	3.7	0.3	3.2	0.4	21,056
0-4	90.4	4.1	2.7	0.4	2.3	0.9	11,189
0-5	92.8	3.3	1.5	0.4	1.9	0.1	7,084
0-6	95.3	2.1	0.9	0.3	1.3	0.1	3,314
ALL							
%*	87.8	5.3	3.3	.4	2.9	0.3	100.0
#	49,328	2,967	1,862	215	1,640	184	56,196

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Monterey, California, 1996.

Representation seems a distant goal after comparing current minority percentages in the general and flag officer corps with those in the U.S. population. Based on the Bureau of Census minority population projections, a representative officer corps or flag and general officer corps seems an unlikely prospect for the future, given the “12-12-5 Plan.” If a racially or ethnically representative officer corps is so unlikely in the relatively near term, one must ask: is representation something the naval service should be striving toward?

The goal of minority representation in the officer corps has its proponents and opponents in the senior ranks of the naval service. Based on a series of interviews with flag and general officers, there seem to be three schools of thought: those who support the idealistic view of equal representation, but without special programs for accession or promotion; those with an idealistic view who support special programs for accession and promotion; and those who do not believe in any special programs based on race/ethnicity, but only on a “best qualified” rule.

A recently retired Rear Admiral captured best the view of interviewees who support a policy of racial/ethnic representation:

Racial and ethnic representation.... Ideally, yes. Getting there requires a dedicated effort in recruiting, officer accession programs, career development programs, and attention to the issue in advancement and promotion selection processes. The Armed Forces (nothing unique about the Naval Services), like it or not, are role models for our society. It is not good enough to mirror society. They must be in the lead in social reform and equality for all citizens. Therefore, the demographics of the population of the Armed Forces, in striving for proportionate representation across the board, must run ahead of industry and corporate America in near-term achievement of representation closer to the total proportionate numbers. While, on an individual basis, “best qualified” must be a basic yard stick for selection in each step of a career, it is incumbent on the Armed Forces to have programs and initiatives

in place that ensure the yard stick can be met with appropriate minority representation.²⁵

Proponents of racial and ethnic representation in the military, as stated above, seem at ease with the idea of quotas or goals in commissioning as well as in promotions. This seems difficult to balance with the concept of "best qualified" if that is to be the yard stick. "Best qualified" implies that no distinction is made between racial, ethnic, gender, or social status; selection is, in fact, conducted on a "best qualified" basis. Other interviewees who supported equal representation did not advocate any social programs to promote officers once commissioned. Instead, these proponents of equal representation seemed to advocate attempting to commission an officer corps racially and ethnically reflective of society, while leaving promotions to "best qualified" advancement. These interviewees seemed to emphasize the importance of equal opportunity, without lowering standards, as a means to achieve a representative force.

Opponents of equal representation in the Naval Service tend to argue as follows:

I strongly believe that recruitment of both officers and enlisted personnel should be based entirely on the traditional factors of 'best qualified,' and 'suitability for service.' If any other factors are used--quota setting, for example --the results would be denial of service opportunities for well qualified individuals. This would be a disservice to both the military and to the eligible recruits. It would inevitably lead to a similar quota system for promotions, for special details, and for school selections, thereby breaking the Navy/Marine Corps into an aggregation of cliques made up of the racial

²⁵Information and quotes are from interviews with retired and active duty flag and general officers. See Appendix.

or ethnic backgrounds of their members. Instead, all selections should be for merit alone, and should not be influenced by any other factors.²⁶

As of 1996, the Navy and Marine Corps had no formal quotas for racial or ethnic minorities in officer recruiting. Instead, the naval service uses minority goals, currently “12-12-5,” for recruiting officers, but not in promotions. Officer selection officers (OSOs) who are often under pressure to meet minority goals, however, are likely to perceive little difference between a goal and a quota. It seems safe to assume that, if the naval service has almost doubled the minority goals in the last several years, there is a growing emphasis on developing a more diverse officer corps. With goal obtainment pressure, however, it seems important to ensure quality is not sacrificed with increased minority commissions. And, as proportionately more minorities join the junior officer corps, will they continue through thirty years of service, under a “best qualified” system, and rise to flag or general officer rank?

²⁶Flag and general officer interviews, Appendix.

III. MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN SOCIETY

Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, authority is given to Congress to “raise and support armies...[t]o provide and maintain a Navy [and] to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” However, we also expect the military to maintain some professional autonomy while remaining politically neutral. One of the reasons this delicate relationship has survived is due to an appreciation and understanding of the military by our government leaders. Understanding of military matters has traditionally come from personal experience in the armed forces or, at least, through a dedicated study of military affairs. If military experience through service declines among our elected officials, will military issues and legislation receive less attention from those same elected officials? One study has linked the veteran status of Congressional members to their voting behavior in defense-related legislation.²⁷ This raises an important question: does the veteran status of our elected officials help or hinder their relationship with our elite military leaders?

This chapter explores the possible effect that military experience may have on the relationship between elite naval leaders and elected officials. A divide between elected officials and the flag and general officer corps may, indeed, result from a lack of knowledge among the elected officials regarding military matters. This chapter examines literature on the past voting behavior of veterans in Congress and military issues taken on by a President without military experience. An analysis of Congressional voting behavior is followed by

²⁷Roger D. Little, “Senate Military Veterans Voting on Defense Issues, 1983-90” (paper presented at the biennial conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland, October 1993).

a review of the debates surrounding gays in the military and readiness versus modernization of the naval service. These debates between the President, Congress, and the leadership of the naval service may highlight a growing gap in civil-military relations.

A. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Members of Congress who served in the armed forces during World War II and Korea are now being replaced by a younger generation of legislators who tend to have had no military service.²⁸ Veterans of Vietnam or, more recently the Gulf War, now comprise only a small percentage of the population eligible to serve in Congress or as president. The portion of American men who have served in the military has also been in steady decline since the force drawdowns after the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, several studies have linked the military experience of Congressional members to their voting behavior on defense-related matters.²⁹

In a December 12, 1994 *Navy Times* article, Rick Maze observed that just 54 senators and 157 representatives were veterans in the 104th Congress, six fewer senators and 21 fewer representatives than in the 103rd Congress. In a November 25, 1996 *Navy Times* article, Rick Maze further observed that only 48 senators and 138 representatives will be veterans when the 105th Congress opens in January 1997.³⁰

²⁸Ibid., p. 1.

²⁹See Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," in U.S. Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition?, edited by Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1994, p. 53.

³⁰Rick Maze, "Fewer Veterans in Congress," and "New Congress Will Have Fewer Veterans," *Navy Times*, December 12, 1994, p. 12, and November 25, 1996, p. 1, respectively.

Actually, a steady decline in elected officials with military experience has been occurring since the 98th Congress. Table 3.1 compares levels of military experience among members of the Senate and House of Representatives, from the 98th Congress to the 103d.³¹ The House of Representatives has seen a 27 percent decrease in members with military experience between 1983 and 1992. During the same time frame, the level of military experience among senators has decreased by 23 percent. The cumulative decrease between 1983 and 1992 among members of Congress with military experience has been 27 percent.

Table 3.1. Percentage of Members of Congress with Military Experience, by Session, Legislative Body, and Type of Service

Session of Congress	House		Senate		Total	
	Active Duty	Reserve/ Active Duty	Active Duty	Reserve/ Active Duty	Active Duty	Reserve/ Active Duty
98th	50.5	56.8	63.4	76.2	52.9	60.5
99th	46.9	52.9	61.4	75.2	49.6	57.1
100th	44.5	50.2	55.4	69.3	46.6	53.8
101st	39.2	48.4	56.4	69.3	42.4	52.3
102d	42.8	48.0	55.9	69.6	45.3	52.0
103d	34.0	40.5	49.0	58.8	36.9	43.9

Source: Derived from information contained in LEGI-SLATE data files. Published in U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, p. 54.

In analyzing Congressional voting behavior, a 10-year study was conducted using 50 key defense-related votes. This study, as documented in U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In

³¹Ibid., Table 3.2, pp. 54.

Crisis or Transition?, analyzed the period that covers the 98th (1983-1984) through 102d (1991-1992) Congresses (see Tables 3.2, and 3.3).³² Veteran status for members of Congress was defined as those who had served in the military, active or reserve, regardless of whether veterans benefits were earned.

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 depict the voting behavior of members of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, broken down by age cohort and veteran or nonveteran status. The age cohorts were determined in a general fashion to distinguish between members of Congress who were eligible for service in World War II (Oldest), Vietnam (Middle), and Post-Vietnam generations (Youngest). Reading across the rows of each age cohort--comparing veteran and nonveteran votes on pro-defense-related legislation--veterans, regardless of age cohort, have overwhelmingly voted pro-defense. Senate voting among veterans from 1982 through 1993, in the middle age group, was 8.6 percent higher for pro-defense legislation than among nonveterans in the same age group. Pro-defense voting in the House of Representatives "...strengthens as the groups get older (and perhaps more conservative, in general) reaching a level of 56 to 57 percent, in contrast to about 53 percent for the youngest cohort."³³ Conclusions drawn from this study imply stronger defense voting among veteran members of Congress; however, as the authors admit, "[v]oting analysis is, at best, a tricky business."³⁴

³²Ibid., pp. 60-61.

³³Ibid., p. 59.

³⁴Ibid., p. 55.

**Table 3.2. U.S. Senate Voting Behavior on Pro-Defense Legislation,
by Session, Birth Cohort, and Veteran Status**

Group	Total Votes Possible						Percent Votes Pro-Defense					
	98th	99th	100th	101st	102d	All	98th	99th	100th	101st	102d	All
Oldest (before 1928)	407	376	326	274	333	1,716	56.3	58.0	45.7	55.8	43.2	52.0
Nonveteran	60	48	38	30	28	204	55.0	56.3	39.5	36.7	39.3	47.5
Veteran	347	328	288	244	235	1,442	56.5	58.2	46.5	58.2	56.6	55.2
 Middle (1928-43)	 496	 526	 563	 649	 622	 2,856	 57.1	 61.2	 60.4	 62.6	 65.3	 61.5
Nonveteran	156	168	223	258	252	1,057	41.0	51.2	57.0	57.8	66.3	56.1
Veteran	340	358	340	391	370	1,799	64.4	65.9	62.6	65.7	64.6	64.7
 Youngest (after 1943)	 38	 50	 85	 60	 78	 311	 76.3	 66.0	 56.5	 48.3	 55.1	 58.5
Nonveteran	9	10	37	20	29	105	100.0	100.0	64.9	40.0	51.7	62.9
Veteran	29	40	48	40	49	206	69.0	57.5	50.0	52.5	57.1	56.3

Source: Derived from information contained in LEGI-SLATE data files. Published in U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, p. 61.

Table 3.3. House of Representatives Voting Behavior on Pro-Defense Legislation, by Session, Birth Cohort, and Veteran Status

Group	<u>Total Votes Possible</u>					<u>Percent Votes Pro-Defense</u>						
	98th	99th	100th	101st	102d	All	98th	99th	100th	101st	102d	All
Oldest (before 1928)	952	1001	961	964	940	4,818	53.8	52.2	54.8	56.8	66.8	56.8
Nonveteran	197	195	202	208	169	971	53.3	53.8	55.4	55.8	71.0	57.5
Veteran	755	806	759	756	771	3,847	53.9	51.9	54.7	57.1	65.9	56.7
Middle (1928-43)	2,257	2,230	2,228	2,180	2,219	11,114	52.9	50.7	54.2	54.9	66.0	55.7
Nonveteran	1,059	1,085	982	923	949	4,996	50.2	49.3	51.7	50.8	62.0	52.8
Veteran	1,198	1,145	1,246	1,257	1,270	6,116	55.2	52.0	56.2	57.9	68.4	58.1
Youngest (after 1943)	963	966	961	1,050	991	4,931	50.2	49.0	50.7	52.7	61.5	52.8
Nonveteran	730	759	734	808	775	3,806	47.9	46.9	48.9	50.0	59.9	50.8
Veteran	233	207	227	242	216	1,125	57.1	56.5	56.4	61.6	67.1	59.7

Source: Derived from information contained in LEGI-SLATE data files. Published in U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, p. 62.

Defense-related legislation in the House and Senate is typically deliberated and refined in one of several subcommittees. Subcommittees are created to focus on a variety of topics, and they are the deliberating bodies where most the work on legislation is done. For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee deals with defense legislation; but, this work is divided initially among a variety of subcommittees such as the Subcommittee on Personnel, the Subcommittee on Seapower, and the Subcommittee on Readiness. The veteran status of the members of these subcommittees should be seen as critical in shaping defense-related legislation before it comes to a vote in the main bodies of Congress. In the 104th Congress, most members of these three Senate subcommittees had some military experience. In fact, four of six members of the Subcommittees on Personnel and Seapower, and eight of nine members of the Subcommittee on Readiness had served in the military.³⁵ Military experience in key legislative positions such as these may help to reduce possible isolation from occurring between elected officials and the senior leaders of the Naval Service.

³⁵In 1996, the members and military experience of the Senate Armed Services subcommittees were as follows: Subcommittee on Personnel; Daniel R. Coats, (R)-IN, Army, 1966-1968., John McCain (R)-AZ, Navy, 1958-1981, Richard J. Santorum, (R)-PA, no military service, Robert C. Byrd (D)-WV, no military experience, Edward M. Kennedy, (D)-MA, Army, 1951-1953, Charles Robb (D)-VA, Marine Corps, 1961-1970. Subcommittee on Seapower; William S. Cohen, (R)-ME, no military experience, John W. Warner, (R)-VA, John McCain (R)-AZ, Navy, 1958-1981, Robert C. Smith, (R)-NH, Navy, 1965-1967., Edward M. Kennedy, (D)-MA, Army, 1951-1953., J. James Exon, (D)-NE, Army Reserves, 1945-1949, Charles Robb (D)-VA, Marine Corps, 1961-1970, Joseph Lieberman (D)-CT, no military experience. Subcommittee on Readiness; John McCain (R)-AZ, Navy, 1958-1981, William S. Cohen, (R)-ME, no military experience, Daniel R. Coats, (R)-IN, Army 1966-1968, James M. Inhofe (R)-OK, Army, 1954-1956, Richard J. Santorum (R)-PA, no military experience, John H. Glenn, (D)-OH, Marine Corps 1942-1965, Jeff Bingaman, (D)-NM, Army Reserves, 1968-1974, Charles Robb, (D)-VA, Marine Corps, 1961-1970, Richard H. Bryan, (D)-NV, Army 1959-1960. Data provided in Congressional Biographical Records, as compiled in LEXIS-NEXIS, 1996.

The issue of military experience among members of the Executive and Legislative Branches was discussed with general and flag officers. A variety of opinions were expressed by the interviewees. When asked if it was important for the president and members of Congress to have some military experience, flag and general officers responded in the following manner:³⁶

Yes, for a better understanding of the importance of a strong military and so that the benefits we once thought we had will be put back rather than continually eroded away.

The fate of the military is in civilian hands.... Compare 1960 in Vietnam, when military voices were ignored and the Persian Gulf War, when military experience in the White House was predominate; 55,000 killed in Vietnam, and only a few hundred casualties in the Persian Gulf.

Yes, it is important because one should understand what it means to commit our people to combat.

Military service is not a necessary factor in making informed judgments on military matters; however, it helps to know a bit about the subject before rendering decisions that affect the country's future safety. Military service is important in our system of government because a democracy is directed by the majority of its members--in our system, the civilians elected to office. If those elected members, both in the executive and legislative branches, who are in the majority have little knowledge of the military, they might not be as well-informed as they should be in making decisions on the use of the nation's military power in international crises.

It is not *essential* for the president, although it is important that the president, members of Congress *and* key civilian members of the Defense Department be knowledgeable about military affairs. The key is that they are prepared to view military service with respect and not disdain.

³⁶The Appendix shows the number of flag and general officers interviewed. The interview protocol is also presented here.

Flag and general officers in the sample were also asked whether they thought that members of Congress are becoming less knowledgeable in military matters. The interviewees offered two basic views, paraphrased as follows:

1. Yes--but...

We professional military people certainly have an understandable bias toward people who have some experience and personal knowledge of our profession. There is a perception that veterans in elective office will provide for our needs better than those without that background. So I would easily answer this in the affirmative. However, as a taxpaying citizen I believe that a military background for elected officials is only in the "desirable" category and not essential. What is important is to elect officials who are honest, intelligent, and unbiased in their views on the maintenance and use of military in the national interest, and who are able to deal with the issues involving the Armed Services in a rational and balanced manner. In this era of the All-Volunteer military, which means a higher percentage of career military, without major conflict to require huge standing forces, it is statistically impossible to expect that very many elected national officials will have a military background.

2. Yes--and...

Without a doubt, there is less knowledge of military subjects in Congress than in times past. This is, in part, because of the lack of military service of many members of Congress, and, in part, by their consequent lack of interest in things military; but primarily by the fact that there has been a great influx of young congressmen (and women) with no experience in dealing with the military services. The older, more senior members, have served long enough to have experienced knowledgeable military testimony, visits to military commands, and other exposures to military matters. The lack of knowledge of the majority of new congressional members can only adversely affect the relationship between Congress and senior military officers as they interact.

A retired admiral shared a dated, but telling anecdotal experience on the issue of "military literacy" in Congress:

I once was the neighbor of a member of Congress--not a good friend, but a speaking acquaintance. He approached me one day while I was mowing my lawn, and asked my opinion on the development of the AEGIS system. I responded enthusiastically that it was the most important new weapons development in the Navy, and proceeded to explain the technical and military reasons for my opinion. After hearing me out, Congressman X. Said: 'Well, I guess I should have talked to you before I spoke on the floor and recommended the cancellation of AEGIS.' I agreed that he should have. Our relationship was not improved, but I believe he became much more knowledgeable on *that* subject.

Examples and opinions such as these suggest that relations between senior military leaders and elected officials are becoming separated or somewhat strained. An example of this type of strain or isolation is more pointedly seen in the debate that took place during 1993 when President Clinton attempted to lift the ban on gays in the military.

B. EXECUTIVE BRANCH

On January 29, 1993, the President directed me to review DoD policy on homosexuals in the military. The President further directed that the DoD policy be 'practical, realistic, and consistent with the high standards of combat effectiveness and unit cohesion our armed forces must maintain.'³⁷

This was extracted from a memo sent by Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, to the service secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Thus, President Clinton began his push to change military policy as his first executive priority, fulfilling his campaign promise to gay interest groups. For a President who once avoided military service and was already viewed with some distrust by those who chose to serve, a backlash of

³⁷Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject: Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, by Les Aspin, July 19, 1993.

reactions from the military establishment seemed inevitable. President Clinton's lack of military service has been highlighted among veterans groups, political opponents, and a substantial portion of the voting public, as published in several polls taken at the time. The extent of this isolation was well-voiced by Eitelberg and Little in "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War:"

By March 1993, interviews and polls with officers, enlisted personnel, and veterans pinpointed five main areas of concern: the president's avoidance of the Vietnam War; his attempt to lift the ban on homosexuals; fears about his scheme to cut the defense budget; resentment over a Clinton administration proposal to freeze military pay; and 'the prevalent view that Mr. Clinton and his staff neither understand military life nor like military people.'³⁸

Each of these five topics may have further added to tensions between the administration and flag and general officers, but no issue contrasted a President against the military elite more than the issue of homosexuals in the military. Flag and general officers interviewed for the study consistently cited this issue as a primary argument for preferring the commander and chief of the military to have military experience. Virtually all interviewees also observed that the homosexual issue had heightened tensions and diminished the rapport between military leaders and the president.

According to the General Accounting Office, the military had dismissed 1,500 service members a year for homosexuality between fiscal years 1980 and 1990. "Although

³⁸Mark J Eitelberg, and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," in U.S. Civil-Military Relations In Crisis or Transition?, edited by Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C., 1994, p. 49.

the Navy represented only 27 percent of the total active-duty personnel in that 11-year period, it accounted for 51 percent of dismissals on grounds of homosexuality...and the Marine Corps, 9 percent of the total and 6 percent of dismissals.”³⁹ These high numbers for the Navy and Marine Corps reflect the awareness and sensitivity to the issue among senior military leaders. The Department of Defense responded to the Government Accounting Office numbers when questioned by *Congressional Quarterly* magazine, saying: “Due to the Navy life at sea during extended deployments, identification of homosexuals may well occur more often than in the other services.”⁴⁰


Over 2,300 active duty enlisted personnel on 38 military bases were polled by the *Los Angeles Times* in the second week of February 1993. An overwhelming majority of these personnel disapproved President Clinton’s plan to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. Figure 3.1 depicts the extent of disapproval, approval, and “don’t know” responses in the poll.

Following Governor Clinton’s election victory in November 1992, a typically obedient military establishment began to publicly voice opinions about the President’s campaign promises of lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military.

‘I can’t remember any time when there was open hostility like this between a commander in chief and the military,’ said Martin Binkin, a military manpower specialist for The Brookings Institution, a moderate think tank here. Clinton determination to lift the gay ban despite strong opposition from

³⁹Pat Towell and Carroll J. Doherty “Fireworks Over Ban on Gays Temporarily Snuffed Out,” in *Congressional Quarterly*, February 6, 1993, p. 274.

⁴⁰Ibid.



the military's top officers could make relations between the president and his troops very difficult, Binkin said, especially since Clinton comes to the commander in chief's job with 'other baggage.'⁴¹

Source: Melissa Healy, "74% of Military Enlistees Oppose Lifting Gay Ban," *Los Angeles Times*, February 28, 1993, p. A23.

Figure 3.1. *Los Angeles Times* Poll: A Closer Look at Who Opposes Lifting Ban

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was especially vocal in his opposition to the new President's proposal, as Kohn observes:

⁴¹William Mathews, "Angry voices batter Clinton's action," *Navy Times*, February 8, 1993.

General Colin Powell must have felt very strongly indeed on this subject, for he virtually defied the President-elect, never denying publicly the rumors in November-December 1992 that he might resign over the issue, doing nothing to scotch rumors that his fellow chiefs might do the same, doing nothing to discourage retired generals from lobbying on Capitol Hill to form an alliance against lifting the ban.⁴²

Whether lifting the ban was right or wrong, the president was proposing to break military tradition, and he apparently ignored the advice of his senior-most military leaders. In fairness to President-elect Clinton, he did appoint John Holum, a Washington-based lawyer to investigate the effects of lifting the ban. "Holum,...who was Clinton's key transition aide on the military gay issue, held 'over 40 meetings with representatives of the military' during the transition period, White House spokesman George Stephanopoulos said Jan. 27."⁴³ The result of these meetings persuaded President Clinton "...not to issue an executive order ending the military's gay ban during his first week in office."⁴⁴ Would a President with military experience have needed three months of research from a lawyer to decide it was a bad idea to issue an executive order the first week of an administration over such a controversial issue? Many comparisons were made in the National media, comparing this issue with President Truman's Executive Order 9981, which ended racial segregation in the military. However,

⁴²Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," *National Interest*, No. 35, Spring 1994, p. 13.

⁴³Grant Willis, "Clinton's decision: No rush job," *Navy Times*, February 8, 1993.

⁴⁴Ibid.

even President Truman did not attempt to approach the controversial issue of racial integration in such an ill-guided manner.⁴⁵

C. READINESS VERSUS MODERNIZATION

Early in 1996, a debate began between the Republican-controlled Congress, top military officials, and the Clinton Administration over recapitalization of military equipment-readiness versus modernization. This debate began as Admiral Owens, Chairman, JCS, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, advised General Shalikashvi, Chairman, JCS, based on reports from global military commanders, that the military should begin a recapitalization of major programs beginning in fiscal year 1997.⁴⁶ If this were to be the case, then the senior leadership of the armed services would have to gain political support in Congress to counter President Clinton's proposals for a declining defense budget.

⁴⁵President Truman's decision to sign Executive Order 9981 in 1948 was preceded by more than two years of debate among senior military officials, Congress, and the president. Congress had introduced the Universal Military Training Bill in 1947, which many members of Congress attempted to use to pass a desegregation bill. President Truman appointed his own committee on civil rights in 1947. Recommendations of this committee, on 29 October 1947, condemned segregation wherever it existed, but President Truman waited until the 26th of July, 1948 to issue his Executive Order. Even with the issuance of this order, it took the action of the Fahy Committee to ensure the desegregation of the military was carried out. It wasn't until 1954 that the Armed Forces were formally declared fully "integrated" by the Department of Defense. The prolonged actions surrounding desegregation of the military stand in sharp contrast to the lightning fashion the Clinton Administration attempted to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. See William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, Ohio State University Press, 1970., Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration Of The Armed Forces 1940-1965, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1981, and Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri, 1969, for more information.

⁴⁶Rowan Scarborough, "Shalikashvili lost battle to raise spending for new weapons now," *Washington Times*, March 8, 1996, pp. 1.

The 1997 defense budget projects a continuing dip in procurement from \$42 billion to \$39 billion--the least since the early 1950s, adjusted for inflation. It puts off the \$60 billion target until 2001, three years later than the Joint Chiefs recommended. ‘This is a major schism between our top military officers and the White House,’ a defense official said.⁴⁷

Positions on defense modernization or readiness are not necessarily described as having to do with military experience. Instead, this issue plays more to the hands of politics, finance, and defense industry lobbying. Despite the many undercurrent powers pushing for readiness or modernizations, a break in civil-military relations is highlighted by persistent confrontations between the White House and the senior military leaders over defense issues.

The focus of the White House on readiness places its highest priority on fully funding operational and maintenance budgets to maintain current readiness of U.S. forces. This focus also provides for a 3 percent pay raise in the 1997 budget and also adds money for housing, child care, and “quality of life” programs. In all, the White House defense budget for 1997 is a 6 percent drop from the budget of the previous year.

This is in contrast to the JCS recommendation to Congress to increase the defense appropriations budget by 60 billion dollars for modernization. Modernization of the force consists of ensuring platforms such as 40-year-old airframes, aging amphibious fleets, and outdated communications equipment are replaced to keep the military on the cutting edge of technology. David C. Morrison, in an article published in *National Journal*, summarized why modernization is such a priority in the 1990s. “Our most serious [threats],” Morris observed:

⁴⁷Scarborough, *Washington Times*, p. 1.

...will come down the road rather than tomorrow morning. Because, the worst thing we have to worry about tomorrow morning is North Korea or Iraq, which are not the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan. But 15 years down the road, we could face something like those powers--China, perhaps.⁴⁸

All of the senior military leaders have spoken openly, not only before Congress, but to the press as well, concerning the necessity to maintain modernization programs. For example, in 1995, the outgoing Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., said,

...the Corps is not hollow, but shallow. Short-term readiness is being maintained, ...but I remain concerned about the not-so-distant implications of continuing to defer needed investment in the Marine Corps of the future.⁴⁹

An article in the *Washington Post* further echoed concerns of a group of retired four-star officers:

...[who said] in a recent report to Congress that the administration was 'failing utterly' to invest adequately in the nation's military future. 'Our legacy to the next generation is likely to be 45-year-old training aircraft, 35-year-old bombers and airlifters, 25-year-old fighters, 35-year-old trucks and 40-year-old medium lift helicopters,' said the report by Air Force Gen. Charles A. Gabriel, Marine Gen. Alfred M. Gray, Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost and Army Gen. Robert W. RisCassi.⁵⁰

Whether this debate began and ended as a political "turf war" or not, this is another instance of the senior military leadership of the services speaking out against elected

⁴⁸David C. Morrison, "Ready for What?," *National Journal*, March 20, 1995, p. 1219.

⁴⁹Ibid, p. 1220.

⁵⁰Bradley Graham, "Clinton Administration Trades Military Modernization for Readiness," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1995, p. A20.

officials. In American democracy, the military has been placed subordinate to its civilian leadership. In politics, the military leaders are supposed to remain neutral, while still voicing necessary opinions when requested to do so by the president or Congress. A point of excess is difficult to identify in this realm, but it seems that the military leaders of today are being drawn into the political process more and more. If persons without military experience continue to be elected to public office, will this further draw upon military leaders to politically defend what they see as best, militarily, for the U.S.? Or, does this further exacerbate tension and isolation between elected officials and senior military leaders?

IV. VALUES

A. VALUES IN SOCIETY

In our society, the businessman may command more income; the politician may command more power; but the professional man commands more respect. Yet the public, as well as the scholar, hardly conceives of the officer in the same way that it does the lawyer or doctor, and it certainly does not accord to the officer the deference which it gives to the civilian professionals.⁵¹

This 1959 excerpt from Samuel Huntington's The Soldier And The State describes American society's view of the professional officer. While this deference toward civilian professionals may still exist today, military professionals have made tremendous strides toward gaining professional respect among civilians.⁵² Gaining professional competence and respect, however, has not undermined the continued emphasis on tradition and values among flag and general officers. In fact, the further professionalization of the officer corps may have enhanced some fundamental differences in values between the miliary and civilian society. If a different set of values has developed in the military--particularly among flag and general officers--has it been a unique case of military socialization? If so, has this resulted in tension between elected officials and flag and general officers?

⁵¹Samuel Huntington, The Soldier And The State, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959, pp. 7.

⁵²The armed forces have more rigidly enforced education and training standards within the officer corps to produce a more professional force. An all-volunteer force has also be instituted helping to create a more professional organization.

In answering these questions, this chapter addresses possible tension in civil-military relations resulting from varying emphasis being placed on certain core values. This is done by first establishing a common set of values between flag and general officers and elected officials. The socialization processes in the military and among elected officials are then examined. Next, interviews with flag and general officers are reviewed to identify any tension between this group and elected officials based on values.

Four principal values were identified in the course of the study: Personal Values, such as honesty, loyalty, responsibility, and leadership; Social Values, including social responsibility, equality, justice, liberty, religion, community, and pride in country; Political Values, such as civic responsibility, voting, rights versus expediency, public service, the “American Way”; and Moral Values, such as self responsibility, fairness, value basis, example, and lifestyle. These four values represent what might be considered a core set of values in society. Indeed, there are several different types of values, and varying degrees of importance are placed on each of these values by individuals and institutions. In developing a base-line to understand values, values are defined as: “[a]n individual’s or group’s ideas about the worth or importance of people, things, and concepts;” or an “abstract concept of what is right, worthwhile, or desirable; principles or standards.”⁵³

Values held by society or by elected officials and military leaders are an important aspect of civil-military relations. The four values used in this study help identify aspects of individual beliefs that further affect attitudes and behavior. From a value base, individuals

⁵³Leadership, p. 2-A-1.

develop attitudes; and, from these attitudes, behavior is exhibited. Therefore, the significance placed on values are reflected through attitudes and behavior, as projected in a person's character.

For example, suppose an employer's personal value for punctuality is very high. If the employer has two employees who are very similar in their personal make-up, except that one is punctual and the other is always late, he or she will probably have a better attitude toward the one who is punctual. In this case, the employer's values have influenced his or her attitude. A resulting behavior from this attitude might be assigning a major project to the punctual individual over the one who is always late.

In value development, values that are emphasized for elected officials might not have much importance among military leaders. These values may also be developed in completely separate institutional settings. Therefore, as seen in the above example, the significance placed on certain values can easily have a considerable, perhaps subconscious, impact on attitudes and behavior.

Attempting to identify and describe values that have greater emphasis among elected officials than military leaders is no easy feat. Each group and individual may stress one value over another, and by the time all these levels of significance were compiled and quantified, the quality of this data could become obsolete. Nevertheless, if attempted, a more precise view of military values, or a "military mind," might be possible in characterizing the officer corps than in identifying a "civilian mind." As Samuel Huntington has observed:

Just as there is a variety of civilian groups engaged in the struggle for power, so also is there a variety of civilian ethics or ideologies. Consequently, it is

impossible to assume a continuum stretching from military values at one end to civilian values at the other. The military ethic is concrete, permanent, and universal. The term ‘civilian,’ on the other hand, merely refers to what is nonmilitary. No dichotomy exists between the ‘military mind’ and the ‘civilian mind,’ because there is no single ‘civilian mind.’ There are many ‘civilian minds,’ and the difference between any two civilian ethics may be greater than the difference between any one of them and the military ethic.⁵⁴

B. SOCIALIZATION

One approach in defining military values is to identify their source. Values exhibited through attitudes and behavior by general and flag officers may be considered “military” in nature, thus representing a “military mind.” However, as Samuel Huntington points out:

...everything which comes from a military source does not necessarily derive from its character as a military source. Military men are also Frenchmen and Americans, Methodists and Catholics, liberals and reactionaries, Jews and antisemites.⁵⁵

Huntington suggests that this problem of multiple affiliations might be overcome if a broad enough sample of military men were selected for study. In analyzing and quantifying a “military mind,” based on a commonly-defined set of values, I have examined the socialization process of flag and general officers in the naval service.

Flag and general officers have chosen to dedicate their professional working lives in service to the nation. In so doing, these professionals have upheld, undertaken, and developed a unique set of military traditions and values. For example, the Marine Corps

⁵⁴Ibid, Soldier and the State, pp. 89.

⁵⁵Ibid, pp. 60.

places heavy emphasis on tradition in values, as conveyed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak:


Tradition is not something that can be simply written down and filed away for another day. It cannot be reduced to regulations, manuals, or bits and bytes of data. Tradition embodies the values that can never be replaced by the cold precision of machines and electrons. Tradition is that essence of the human spirit which is passed on as one person looks another in the eyes and gives an encouraging slap on the shoulder for doing a task the ‘Marine’ way. It is the sum total of Marine Corps culture that is passes from one generation to the next, in countless scenes across the Corps, as morning coffee is brewed, or evening chow is shared, or a column halts along a dusty road.⁵⁶

Recently, starting in 1994, the Marine Corps has renewed its campaign to place a set of core values at the forefront of training and education. The tenets of these personal values are honor, courage, and commitment. This focus on values at the forefront of training and education continued into 1995, with the recruit depots at both San Diego and Parris Island adding a 20-hour core values package to their recruit training syllabus. Even the professional magazine of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Gazette*, has continued to run stories on the development of core values. In 1996, three such articles--“Instilling Marine Values,” “The Core Values Issue,” and “A Proposed code of Leadership and Ethics for Marines”--appeared in this professional journal.⁵⁷

⁵⁶General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Message on Values, “The Marine Corps: The Best of America’s Values,” as published on the U.S. Marine Corps Internet homepage, 1996.

⁵⁷These first two articles appeared in the September 1996 issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, pp. 54-57, and p. 58, respectively. The third article appeared in the June 1996 issue, pp. 41-44.

On the 19th of October, 1994, a group of approximately twelve active duty general officers met in Quantico, Virginia, at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to discuss a "Vision for the Marine Corps." In this process, the group defined what they considered to be the "uniqueness" of the Marine Corps. A portion of their discussion took the form of Figure 4.1. As seen in this figure, a set of core values is a central off-shoot to what this group of general officers described as the character of the Marine Corps.



Source: Tapped panel discussion, "Core Values," Vision For The Marine Corps, General Officer working group, Marine Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, October 19, 1994.

Figure 4.1. U.S. Marine Corps, Character Development

Marines are also trained and educated in a regimented fashion that further reinforces and develops core values. Officers follow a prescribed set of requirements for advancement and education, from commissioning sources through The Basic School--which all officers attend--to later schooling in selected specialties. The regimentation of advancement is

standardized for a fair and equitable promotion system. In all, the process of socialization in the Marine Corps seems to greatly influence the emphasis placed on a core set of values.

The Navy, much like the Marine Corps, has a very systematic organizational methodology for advancement and education. Officers and enlisted personnel are trained in specialty schools for their career fields and are advanced on the basis of performance, time in service, and education, to name a few. During this process of advancement in the Navy, officers, as well as enlisted personnel are exposed to the Navy's core values--honor, courage, commitment. These core values are an integral part of service life, education, and culture.

An example of the extent and even renewed emphasis on these core values is seen in the Navy's recruit training. A 1996 article in the *Navy Times* discusses the importance of instilling values in new recruits:

This is not your father's boot camp. In fact, this is not your boot camp either. This really, truly is a kinder, gentler boot camp, reformed for a new generation of recruits who might not be as tough--or as well grounded in basic values--as recruits of yesteryear.... Recruits no longer drill with rifles and no longer salute their seniors in the enlisted ranks. Threats give way to exhortation. Explanations are not unheard of. And the words honor, courage and commitment--the Navy's core values--are drummed into recruits at every turn.... Boot camp today isn't just a place where recruits learn the Navy way of doing things. Rather, say training specialists here, it's the starting point for instilling in your men and women the sense of personal responsibility they'll need to be successful sailors. Trainers say too many recruits never developed that sense growing up--not at home, in school or even in church. So these days, values training is part of virtually every step in the process of turning civilians into sailors.⁵⁸

⁵⁸John Burlage, "Has Great Lakes gone too soft on recruits?", *Navy Times*, October 28, 1996, pp. 12-14.

This raw, or renewed, emphasis on core values is not isolated to recruit training, but has penetrated every rank and school in the Navy culture.

Since individual values are the product of experiences gained through affiliations with one's family and institutions, socialization is the process by which we develop values. Important institutions in the socialization of values include: elementary school, middle school, high school, college, church, clubs, sports, military training, and one's working environment, all of which contribute to value development. In the case of flag and general officers, socialization seems to be heavily influenced by military service. The flag and general officers interviewed for this study were asked to categorize the effect of the military in developing their personal, social, political, and moral values. As seen in Table 4.1, a majority of the interviewees felt that the military had a "strong" influence on all four areas of value development.

Table 4.1. Naval Flag and General Officer Opinions Concerning the Importance of the Military in Shaping their Values

Category of Values	<u>Importance of Military (Number Indicating)</u>		
	Strong	Mild	Weak
Personal Values	10	1	0
Social Values	7	4	0
Political Values	6	5	0
Moral Values	7	4	0

Of the eleven general and flag officers asked this question, ten responded that the development of their personal values was strongly influenced by their military experience. The strong influence of the military can also be seen in the development of social, political, and moral values. It is clear that a strong relationship exists between the values held by these flag and general officers and their military socialization.

While the socialization process of the military may play an important role in defining and developing a “military mind,” there is no reason to believe that shared values are not present in some form among elected officials or society as well. Instead, these values are more characteristic in defining and categorizing the flag and general officers as a group. Many of the flag and general officers interviewed also expressed some concern over being narrowly defined, as one admiral stated:

...[A]s you may have detected from answers to other questions, my military experience has not prevented me from forming views and opinions that are not straight down the line with the ultra-conservative right wing image that some view the career military officer as holding. The strong effect is certainly there, but I am proud to form my own opinions with full consideration of factors not traditionally military. Most flag and general officers I know would surely also fit this mold.

The vast majority of Americans, both male and female, have never served in the military. Given current force requirements, a relatively small active-duty military, and the stable security situation of the U.S., population participation in the military will most likely not increase over the near future. With somewhere around 16,000 occupational groups in America, any attempt to categorize a particular group seems futile. Even focusing on elected officials, such as senators and representatives in Congress, proves difficult at best. Members

of Congress seem to have developed in as many different circumstances as their districts are far from each other. There is very little common schooling, let alone structured professional development among these widely diverse groups.⁵⁹

In Chapter III, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that there is more consensus on defense legislation among elected officials who served longer in public office, regardless of veteran status. This also suggest that members who had less time in Congress, and were not veterans, may not value defense issues as much as older or veteran members of Congress. As a new generation of nonveterans enters Congress, and issues of Congressional term limits continue, the priority given to defense matters may be on the decline in Congress.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

If the flag and general officer corps can be described as being of a “military mind,” holding a set of values that reflect a more common base among their own ranks than with elected officials, does tension necessarily develop between these two groups? Tension based on values is a difficult subject to prove in the case of these two groups. Reviewing periodical and newspaper articles covering events and speeches by these groups does little in identifying any strained relationships based on values. The most direct and efficient

⁵⁹Several studies have been conducted over the years concerning the demographic characteristics of members of Congress, including their education, socioeconomic status, and profession before election. These tend to show some shared traits, such as a relatively high proportion of members who were in the legal profession. These shared experiences may lead to some shared values; but the extent of the relationship is unclear. Congress by its very nature meets to deliberate and negotiate interests from across the nation. Its institution is not designed to perpetuate the same individuals through a career of service, but to form a Congress of elected representatives of the people. Given this conflicting nature of prior occupations and Congressional service, it is difficult to delineate a “Congressional Mind.”

approach seems to be gaining some consensus based on opinion interviews. In doing this, I focused solely on flag and general officers.

The flag and general officers interviewed for this study gave a mixed response when asked if tension and isolation, based on values, exist between the military's senior leaders and elected officials. Half of those interviewed concluded that a higher standard of values held by the flag and general officer corps has led to tension between these groups. The other half felt that tension does not exist based on a difference in values, or if a higher standard of values were held. However, several of the flag and general officers who felt this way believed that a certain level of strained relations could be blamed on politicization of the officer corps.

In conclusion, the flag and general officers interviewed here have mixed opinions on the nature of value-based tension with elected officials. There is a strong emphasis on a core set of values in both the Navy and Marine Corps, yet there does not seem to be any similar organizational structure or emphasis on values among elected officials. Although flag and general officers might agree that their military service has profoundly affected their views on values, there is no consensus on whether this has created any sort of tension or discord with Congress. However, as the military places greater emphasis on core values, will the next generation of senior leaders have a stronger sense of military-based beliefs or standards?

V. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis examines whether senior leaders of the naval service are becoming isolated from society in terms of population participation, shared experiences, and values. Based on this, several conclusions are drawn. First, racial and ethnic representation in the flag and general officer corps will continue to lag behind levels of minority representation in the national population; second, military experience among elected officials is declining; and, finally, value differences may exist between senior military leaders and elected officials. Each of these measures of association between society and senior military leaders highlights some degree of isolation and possible tension in civil-military relations.

Conclusions from this study begin with racial and ethnic representation in the flag and general officer corps. The “12-12-5 Plan” has been called a bold step to achieve population diversity in the officer ranks of the Navy and Marine Corps by the early part of the 21st century. However, with the minority population of the U.S. growing at such a rapid rate, it is clear that the naval service will have great difficulty achieving an officer corps that reflects the nation’s minority composition.

This continuing, and probably expanding, gap in minority representation within the officer corps will become even more pronounced among the more senior ranks. It takes an average of about 30 years for a newly-commissioned officer to ascend to the level of admiral or general. Without any special programs or intervention, minority promotions are subject to the same criteria as the rest of the officer corps--that is, “best qualified.” There is no reason to believe, then, that the process of promotion through the ranks for minorities will

be any faster than the average for all officers. In fact, it is more likely that competition to reach the military's senior ranks will intensify over time, perhaps diminishing certain opportunities for minorities relative to whites.

The data on racial and ethnic representation suggest that a certain level of structural isolation already exists between society and senior military leaders. Many regard the military's corps of senior leaders as a "good old boys" club, looking out for its own best interest. This does not imply any racial or ethnic bigotry, but it does suggest resistance to change, especially that which threatens to alter the military's "best qualified" system. This attitude prevailed among most of the flag and general officers interviewed as part of this study.

Some flag and general officers who were interviewed felt that minority representation could be achieved without sacrificing any traditional criteria for individual commissioning or advancement. This opinion is, perhaps, captured in Proposition 209 in California, which seeks to eliminate affirmative action in state hiring, education, and contracts based on race and gender. Actions such as Proposition 209 appear to say that one can support the objectives of equal opportunity without eliminating "best qualified" criteria in recruiting and promotions. Given the extremely political nature of "diversity" issues, they will most likely continue to be a source of tension in civil-military relations. Yet, if the flag and general officer corps does not become more racially and ethnically representative of society--as the minority share of the general population continues to expand--this issue could prove to be a source of strain, isolation, or division in civil-military relations.

The second measure of isolation--military experience--focuses on the declining numbers of veterans in Congress and a lack of military service experience by the President. Senior military leaders who are involved in national security, defense policy, or defense budgeting--to name a few--are "players" in the political process and debate that resolve difficult, often controversial, defense issues. Traditionally, military leaders have not interjected themselves or their views into the political process as a matter of institutional or policy survival, but instead have advised or informed political leaders. This approach prevents military leaders from becoming intertwined in the civilian political process of elected representatives, thereby keeping military views neutral. Military leaders have felt comfortable in their role during modern times because they were usually well-represented by fellow veterans in the White House and Congress. However, as the number of military veterans in Congress continues to decrease, the level of understanding concerning things "military" is likely to decrease in that body as well. Additionally, the past voting behavior of veterans versus nonveterans--on defense-related legislation in the 98th through the 102d Congress--indicate veterans, along with older nonveteran members of Congress, are more likely to vote pro-defense than are younger nonveterans. As younger nonveterans replace older veteran and nonveteran members of Congress, a further decrease is likely in levels of understanding concerning "things military."

This may give rise to an increased reliance on the senior leaders of the military to guide, inform, or design defense policy. Another possible outcome is the emergence of a civilian leadership that is distrustful of military involvement in decision making, subordinating the military to a position of virtual exclusion. In either case, a growing

isolation between “those who serve” and “those who did not” may be a source of tension in civil-military relations.

Several flag and general officers interviewed in this study also suggest that a decreased level of military experience in Congress could actually cause military leaders to become more political in helping certain civilian leaders understand the military. This is the “flip side of the coin” regarding levels of military experience in Congress or in the executive branch. In this way, again, military influence in the decision making process may grow; and a forced association of military and civilian leaders could help to bridge the existing divide between the two.

Current tensions in civil-military relations may be a product to some extent of military inexperience or “military illiteracy” in the legislative and executive branches of government. Additionally, as the immediate security environment of the U.S. continues to remain relatively stable, decreased emphasis may be placed on defense matters. This can be seen in the nation’s national security document, “Engagement and Enlargement,” which emphasizes the expansion of democracy through the promotion of free trade over traditional defense issues. Additionally, the issue of recapitalization of defense equipment versus maintaining current levels of readiness has highlighted a sharp divide in views on defense policy. It is difficult to say whether or not this difference of opinion will eventually help to strengthen the nation’s defense. Nevertheless, as senior military leaders continue to fight for resources and missions in the shrinking defense structure, and as the understanding of “things military” continues to decline among elected officials, a growing tension may develop between Congress and the military establishment.

In looking at values, it is evident that initial expectations were wrong regarding differences between the senior leadership of the military and elected officials. In fact, individuals in both of these groups have likely developed a unique set of values that are not easily compared. Although flag and general officers may have a more narrowly-defined set of values, obtained through military socialization, they also formulate opinions based on many non-military factors. Still, Navy and Marine Corps leaders have placed a renewed emphasis on the core values of honor, courage, and commitment. There may be little evidence of value-based tensions in civil-military relations today; but, a society with an apparently eroding value base is now pitted against a military with a strengthening value base, and these two forces may be in opposition during the not-too-distant future.

It is inevitable, then, that civil-military relations will continue with a certain amount of isolation and tension attributed to racial/ethnic differences, levels of military experience among the nation's civilian leaders, and possible differences in values. This is expected, given the generally conservative culture of the military--particularly among flag and general officers--and the liberal underpinnings of American society. The military will probably not shrink much more in size or influence, despite the missing Cold War-style menace. Nor is American society likely to lose its predominantly liberal orientation. At the same time, there is no reason to expect that the military will become widely popular in society and grow in strength and influence to its Cold War levels, absent a significant threat to national security. The potential consequences of this increasing tension and isolation in civil-military relations are as yet unclear and, thus, an important topic for further study.

APPENDIX

To support and develop this thesis, a dialog was developed with several retired flag and general officers from the Navy and Marine Corps. In total, seventeen flag and general officers participated separately in discussions, either in person or through correspondence. Eleven of these interviewees were retired flag officers; the other six were retired general officers.

The following questions served as a basis for conversations and correspondence:

- Q. 1** Do you think the representation of the Navy/Marine Corps officer and enlisted ranks should be racially and ethnically proportionate with the U.S. population?
- Q. 2** Do you think opportunities of advancement for racial and ethnic minorities are better, worse, or about the same in the Navy / Marine Corps as in the private sector?
- Q. 3** Do you think it is important for the President and the members of Congress to have some military experience? Why is it important under our system of government?
- Q. 4** What percentage of the U.S. population do you think should have served in the military? Is an all-volunteer force detracting from this objective?

Q. 5 What effect would you say the military had on developing your values in the following categories?

<u>Category</u>	<u>Strong</u>	<u>Mild</u>	<u>Weak</u>
<u>Personal Values</u> (example: honesty, loyalty, responsibility, leadership, etc...)	—	—	—
<u>Social Values</u> (example: social responsibility, equality, justice, liberty, religion, community, pride in country, etc...)	—	—	—
<u>Political Values</u> (example: civic responsibility, voting, right vs. expediency, public service, the "American Way," etc...)	—	—	—
<u>Moral Values</u> (self responsibility, fairness, value basis, example, lifestyle, etc...)	—	—	—

Q. 6 Do you think a higher standard of values held by the flag and general officer corps than the political structure (elected officials) will lead to tension and isolation of these groups from each other? Does this condition already exist to some extent?

Q. 7 Do you think the members of Congress are becoming less knowledgeable in military matters? How does this affect the relationship between Congress and the flag general officer corps?

Confidentiality was promised the interviewees to solicit forthright and direct answers to these questions and the subject material. Although direct quotes and summaries of conversations appear in text, no effort was made to identify sources with comments.

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